Continuous threat modeling
without slowing delivery.
Threat modeling runs continuously across design artifacts so material risks are identified before release pressure builds. Every threat is tracked with ownership, severity, and remediation context.
A repeatable threat-modeling workflow.
System decomposition maps trust boundaries, then modeling surfaces high-signal threats with remediation requirements tied to approved intent.
✓
Starting
Initialize pipeline, validate inputs
✓
Ingestion
Fetch Confluence, Jira, GitHub & docs
✓
Decomposition
Map components, flows & trust boundaries
✓
Threat Analysis
Identify potential threats in the design
✓
Critic
Second pass; remove dupes & false positives
✓
Requirements
Generate remediation requirements
✓
Report
Summarize, score & validate output
✓
Complete
Store model, findings & requirements
Specific and actionable requirements.
Each threat includes affected components, risk rationale, and clear remediation guidance linked to implementation tracking.
CRITICAL · F-03Webhook ingestion accepts unsigned third-party events
Integration Sync exposes a public HTTPS endpoint that ingests Jira and GitHub webhook payloads. Handlers process issue-updated and pull-request events to trigger security workflows without verifying a shared secret or signature header.
Because any caller can POST plausible JSON to the endpoint, an attacker can forge workflow triggers, enqueue false verification runs, or probe internal service behavior. In multi-tenant mode, forged tenant identifiers in the body could cause cross-tenant workflow side effects before correlation logic runs.
Because any caller can POST plausible JSON to the endpoint, an attacker can forge workflow triggers, enqueue false verification runs, or probe internal service behavior. In multi-tenant mode, forged tenant identifiers in the body could cause cross-tenant workflow side effects before correlation logic runs.
REC-F03-R01 · architectural_change · merge blocker
Require HMAC signature validation (GitHub X-Hub-Signature-256, Jira signed webhook secret) before enqueueing any job. Reject requests missing or failing verification with 401. Validate with replay tests using captured payloads and invalid signatures.
Require HMAC signature validation (GitHub X-Hub-Signature-256, Jira signed webhook secret) before enqueueing any job. Reject requests missing or failing verification with 401. Validate with replay tests using captured payloads and invalid signatures.
− webhook body processed on arrival
+ signature verified before enqueue
+ tenant resolved from verified delivery metadata only
5×
Earlier remediation efficiency
8
Agent pipeline stages
24
Prioritized threats from modeling
6
Threats needing manual review