Security Design Reviews
without slowing delivery.
Every PRD, design doc, and architecture decision is reviewed against your standards and controls. Output is structured, traceable requirements teams can actually enforce.
Design Review Pipeline
From intake to approved requirements, each review produces auditable output that flows directly into verification and merge policy.
✓
Starting
Initialize pipeline, validate inputs
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Ingestion
Fetch Confluence, Jira, GitHub & docs
✓
Decomposition
Map components, flows & trust boundaries
✓
Threat Analysis
Identify potential threats in the design
✓
Critic
Second pass; remove dupes & false positives
✓
Requirements
Generate remediation requirements
✓
Report
Summarize, score & validate output
✓
Complete
Store model, findings & requirements
Specific and actionable requirements.
Each finding includes affected components, risk rationale, and clear remediation guidance linked to implementation tracking.
CRITICAL · F-01Third-party integration credentials stored without encryption
In the proposed design, the Org Integration Store holds per-tenant OAuth tokens for Jira, Confluence, and GitHub in Cloud SQL (us-central1). Scheduled sync workers retrieve these credentials through the integration API.
Because tokens are stored in plaintext, anyone with snapshot access, backup recovery rights, or a privileged SELECT can obtain credentials that authenticate to customer Jira, Confluence, and GitHub environments. This turns a database-layer incident into cross-tenant third-party compromise.
Because tokens are stored in plaintext, anyone with snapshot access, backup recovery rights, or a privileged SELECT can obtain credentials that authenticate to customer Jira, Confluence, and GitHub environments. This turns a database-layer incident into cross-tenant third-party compromise.
REC-F01-R01 · architectural_change · merge blocker
Encrypt integration credentials in the application before writing to Cloud SQL, using Cloud KMS for key management. Restrict decrypt to the integration-sync service account. Validate with a snapshot-restore test that usable OAuth tokens cannot be recovered without KMS access.
Encrypt integration credentials in the application before writing to Cloud SQL, using Cloud KMS for key management. Restrict decrypt to the integration-sync service account. Validate with a snapshot-restore test that usable OAuth tokens cannot be recovered without KMS access.
− credential columns stored as plaintext
+ credential columns stored as ciphertext (Cloud KMS)
+ decrypt limited to integration-sync workload
3×
Faster review cycles (pilot median)
5×
Reviewer leverage (pilot median)
Linked
Requirements tied to merge verdicts
Traceable
Decisions back to source review